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 1 
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING 
 
Gleider I Hernández* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The role of judicial institutions in the development of international law has been open 
question since the days of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Already in 1934, 
Hersch Lauterpacht had advanced the claim that ‘judicial law-making is a permanent feature 
of the administration of justice in every society’.1 In many respects, if the adjective ‘judicial’ 
can be used as pertaining to a court of law or a system of courts of law that are dedicated to 
the administration of justice within a legal order,
2
 understanding a judiciary’s role in law-
making remains a foundational question as to the nature and form of a legal system.  
The sheer number of international judicial institutions, each with their specific 
mandate, renders any sweeping commentary on the phenomenon of international judicial law-
making rather illusory in this brief treatment of the question. Instead, a few ideas will be 
highlighted, so as to test whether any generalisations can be made about international judicial 
law-making. The question is not merely theoretical, but a matter of the actual practice of 
international judicial institutions. As such, the first section will consider the question of 
judicial law-making at the international level in the abstract. The second part of this study 
will consider how the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and its predecessor, 
the the Permanent Court of International Justice, have contributed to the development of 
international law. As the first permanent international court, its structure has usually been the 
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1
 H Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(Longmans, London 1934), 45. 
2
 Cf. HLA Hart, in The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 edn (Clarendon, Oxford 1994), 132, who describes these courts as 
‘rule-making authorities’ within a legal system. 
 2 
archetype against which other international judicial institutions have been designed, and its 
body of case law stretching over nearly a century allows for clear observations as to its 
contributions to the process of international law-making. In the third part, a brief survey of 
judicial law-making will review the work of the WTO’s Appellate Body, the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the American and 
European human rights courts.  
II. INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING 
 
It is an incontrovertible fact that a decision choosing one of two or more alternative courses 
equally available to the judge has an impact upon the understanding of the law in the future, 
whether by the judge, the lawyer or, indeed, by the public. Especially if it is an important or path-
finding decision, the living law is not the same thereafter. The judge has become the instrument of 
change through which the process of adaptation takes place to the needs of the time. Decisions 
piled upon decisions thus make a whole corpus of law, whether or not the process be prohibited by 
state authority or settled tradition.
3
 
 
Although it is surely premature to suggest that international law has developed a robust 
international judicial function,
4
 it is safe to admit that law-making is an intrinsic element of 
adjudication,
5
 at least conceptually, in so far as clarifying ambiguities, filling perceived gaps, 
and safeguarding the coherence of a system is concerned. Some would go further: 
Lauterpacht emphasised the right (if not outright duty) of the international judge to develop 
the law,
6
 and foresaw that a judgment in which this occurred need not be within the exercise 
of purely subjective discretion, but rather, be described as ‘fulfilling what the legislator 
would have intended if he could have foreseen the changes occurring in the life of the 
                                                 
3
 CG Weeramantry, ‘The Function of the International Court of Justice in the Development of International 
Law’, (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 309, 313. 
4
 But cf. Y Shany, ‘No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New 
International Judiciary’, (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 73, 74. 
5
 A von Bogdandy and I Venzke, ‘On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking’, 
(2011) 12(5) German Law Journal 1341, 1345. 
6
 In Lauterpacht, supra note 1, 8, he succinctly described the lawmaking function of the Court as ‘the creation, 
development and clarification of an imposing body of rules of international law of varying degrees of 
crystallisation.’  
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community.’7 As such, because the basic principle of providing a reasoned judgment is a 
necessary precondition to the use of judicial pronouncements as a source of law,
8
 these 
reasoned judgments become authoritative through the use of a consistent process and 
method.
9
 If seen as vested with the appropriate authority, courts can clarify the content of 
unwritten law, whether custom or general principle, through its concrete application to a 
given legal dispute or situation; they can clarify ambiguities in the interpretation of a legal 
text; they can provide systematisation to a question of law where there might be conflicting 
practice or ambiguity.  
Moreover, the interpretation of a principle or rule by a judicial body channels it into a 
concrete form, and ‘bestows it with meaning and authoritative weight.’10 Courts and tribunals 
enjoy peculiar advantages due to their formal structure: they are provided with details of 
particular disputes submitted to them; judges are appointed to their benches for having the 
requisite legal expertise to do so; they follow a procedure specified in advance; and they are 
above all ‘required to fashion a just result which is in consonance with the infinite variations 
of fact that can exist in the application of a particular principle’.11 In this respect, adjudicative 
reasoning shapes the method of discourse, outlining the contours of what is admissible and 
inviting participants in the legal process to adopt its own processes and methods. 
Accordingly, making law in a series of continuous small-scale decisions, built around a 
                                                 
7
 H Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Stevens and Sons, London 
1958), 21, 80. 
8
 See JE Álvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (OUP, Oxford 2005), 554. 
9
 GG Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice vol I (Grotius, Cambridge 
1986), 648. See also Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Second 
Phase) [1964] ICJ Rep 6, Separate Opinion of Judge Tanaka, 65-6: ‘[t]he most important function of the Court 
… is to be found not only in the settlement of concrete disputes, but also in its reasoning, through which it may 
contribute to the development of international law. It seems hardly necessary to say that the real life of a 
decision should be found in the reasoning rather than in the conclusion.’ 
10
 A Boyle and C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (CUP, Cambridge 2007), 272. 
11
 Weeramantry, above n 3, 319. 
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general principle, gives judicial institutions ‘a degree of considered elaboration which no 
legislature has the opportunity to achieve.’12  When they hand down such decisions, they 
make a ‘definitive and authoritative impact on the development of law.’13 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
A. The formal role of the International Court in international law-making 
One must proceed from the starting-point that international courts, and hence the ICJ, 
have no formal role in law-making. It is true that it operates as the single permanent 
international judicial institution with competence over all matters of general international 
law,
14
 and the ‘principal judicial organ’ of the United Nations Organization.15 However, 
nothing in the ICJ Statute can be read as suggesting that its judgments are creative of 
international law.
16
 It has no automatic compulsory jurisdiction over UN member States, even 
if these are ipso facto parties to its Statute.
17
 It has no appellate jurisdiction over other 
international tribunals, and thus no competence to ensure ‘systematic coherence’ between the 
judgments of different international judicial institutions.
18
 What is more, it hardly bears 
recalling that Article 38 of the ICJ Statute relegates ‘judicial decisions’ to subsidiary means 
                                                 
12
 ibid 320. 
13
 M Lachs, ‘Some Reflections on the Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of 
International Law’, (1983) 10 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 239, 245. 
14
 See Art. 36, para. 1, of the Court’s Statute, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.: the Court enjoys 
jurisdiction over any dispute that States may submit to it, including any matters provided for in the Charter, or in 
‘treaties or conventions in force.’ Art. 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (in force 20 August 1921), 
UKTS 4 (1919) Cmd 153, was even more clear: the Permanent Court of International Justice was ‘competent to 
hear and determine any dispute of an international character’ submitted to it. 
15
 Art. 92 of the Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS xvi; UKTS 67 (1946), Cmd 7015 (26 June 1945). 
16
 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (Merits) [1982] ICJ Rep 18, Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Gros, 143, 152. 
17
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, as annexed to the Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 1 
UNTS xvi; UKTS 67 (1946), Cmd 7015. 
18
 As Boyle and Chinkin, above n 10, 263, put it, ‘[c]onstitutionally it is simply one court among many.’ 
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for the determination of the rules of law, alongside the ‘teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists’.19 Thus, even though ‘judicial decisions’ (those of all courts, not only the ICJ’s) 
are recognised as subsidiary sources of the law under Article 38, they assist primarily in the 
elucidation and interpretation of legal norms that are grounded on a formal source of 
international law.
20
 Perhaps for reasons of continuity, or because the ICJ Statute is annexed to 
the UN Charter, the sources of international law as enumerated in Article 38 are ‘often put 
forward as a complete statement of the sources of international law’.21 In any event, no 
international court or tribunal formally recognises its judgments as a primary source of 
international law. 
 Yet to focus purely on the formal role of the Court’s judgments would be short-
sighted, and in practice, few have been so insistent. To give but one example, in 1947, the 
General Assembly proclaimed that ‘it is…of paramount importance that the Court should be 
utilized to the greatest practical extent in the progressive development of international law.’22 
This was, to be sure, a mere preambulatory clause, encouraging States and United Nations 
organs to make greater use of the ICJ. However, in its substance, Resolution 171 also 
embodied the belief that the ICJ, its principal judicial organ, could be used effectively as an 
                                                 
19
 Art. 38 (1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.; RY Jennings, ‘The Judiciary, 
International and National, and the Development of International Law’ (1996) 45 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1, 3: ‘Article 38 constitutes a necessary recognition of the basic principle of the process of 
adjudication that judges, whether national or international, are not empowered to make new laws. Whatever 
modification and development of the law is made ‘must be seen to be within the parameters of permissible 
interpretation’. 
20
 Baron Descamps (Belgium)’s colourful description of the international judicial function: ‘[d]octrine and 
jurisprudence no doubt do not create law; but they assist in determining rules which exist. A judge should make 
use of both jurisprudence and doctrine, but they should serve only as elucidation.’ See PCIJ Advisory 
Committee of Jurists, Procès-verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16
th
-July 24
th
 1920, with 
Annexes (The Hague, Van Langenhuysen Bros 1920), 336. See also Lauterpacht, supra note 1, 22. 
21
 See J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (7th edn OUP, Oxford 2012), 22, who in 
fact suggests that they cannot be regarded as a straightforward enumeration, thus breaking somewhat with 
Brownlie’s less critical view; M Shaw, International Law (7th edn CUP, Cambridge 2011) 6. P Daillier, A 
Pellet, M Forteau and D Müller, Droit international public (8
th
 edn LGDJ, Paris 2009), 126, regard them as an 
‘énumération universellement acceptée des sources formelles du droit international’. 
22
 UNGA, ‘Need for greater use by the United Nations and its organs of the International Court of Justice’, GA 
Res 171 (II) (1947), UN Doc A/519, 103. 
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agent for ‘progressive development’23 as well as the faith that the administration and 
development of substantive international law could safely be trusted to impartial, objective 
judges, whose determinations would ‘naturally’ have repercussions ‘in many spheres 
including the political’.24 As such, even though a formal law-making role was denied to it, 
from the outset it has been envisaged that it could make a substantive contribution to the 
development of international law. 
 
B. Limitations to the International Court’s law-making authority 
Before turning to the law-making potential of the Court, one must first identify some of 
the limitations under which it operates. First is the essentially reactive character of the 
International Court’s work.25 Judicial opinions are essentially concerned with resolving past 
disputes: it is only when they are viewed as precedents that they gain the potential to 
determine the law in the future. Because it depends on cases instituted before it, or opinions 
requested of it, the Court cannot exercise the same systemic function as a domestic supreme 
court that can select the portfolio of cases that will be argued before it. The Court’s relatively 
weak jurisdictional structure serves as a second limitation; dependent on the consent of States 
parties to a dispute, and with a minority of States having accepted its compulsory 
jurisdiction,
26
 it is not guaranteed a regular docket of cases,
27
 and there is no possibility of 
                                                 
23
 A concept generally associated with Article 1 of the ILC Statute: see UNGA, ‘Establishment of an 
International Law Commission’, GA Res 174 (II), UN Doc A/519 (21 November 1947), 105. 
24
 R Higgins, Problems and Process (OUP, Oxford 1994), 202; R Higgins, ‘International Law and the 
Avoidance, Containment, and Resolution of Disputes’, (1991-V) Recueil des Cours 9, 261. 
25
 ibid 785. 
26
 As of 31
 
July 2012, 67 States had deposited with the Secretary-General a declaration of acceptance of the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2: see Report of the International 
Court of Justice (1 August 2011-31 July 2012), GAOR 67
th
 Sess. Supp. No. 4, UN Doc A/67/4, 1, para. 7. 
27
 It cannot but be noted with some humour that the 1974 Reports of the International Court were six pages long. 
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systemic contribution due to this ‘exceptionality.28 Further, the judges of the Court have 
stated extra-judicially that they are ‘reluctant lawmakers’, eager not to be perceived to be 
making law.
29
 As such, its body of case law has developed with a keen sense of deference to 
State consent, and a great reluctance to be seen as overstepping such consent.
30
  
The caution of the Court in relation to the consent of parties before also translates into 
making any pronouncements on substantive international law. The Court’s restraint has been 
consistent, as is evidenced by the 1974 judgment on Fisheries Jurisdiction, where Germany 
and the United Kingdom filed proceedings against Iceland: when considering the codification 
and progressive development of the law of the sea simultaneously taking place at the third 
Conference of the Law of the Sea, it declared that ‘[i]n the circumstances, the Court as a 
Court of law, cannot render judgment sub specie legis ferendae, or anticipate the law before 
the legislator has laid it down.’31  Similarly, in its advisory opinion in the Legality of the Use 
or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, the Court reaffirmed that: 
                                                 
28
 G Abi-Saab, ‘Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks’ (1999) 31 New York Journal of 
International Law and Policy 919, 922. 
29
 D Terris, CP Romano & L Swigart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and Women who 
decide the World’s Cases (OUP, Oxford 2007), 129. See also M Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court 
(Grotius, Cambridge 1997), 233. 
30
 See eg Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, [2006] ICJ Rep 6, 39, para. 88 (emphasising the importance 
of consent in relation to compromissory clauses conferring jurisdiction; Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France) [2008] ICJ Rep 177, 204, para. 62 (emphasising the need for consent to 
the Court’s jurisdiction to be ‘certain’, and not only on matters relating to jurisdiction based on forum 
prorogatum); and Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v Russia) (Preliminary Objections), Judgment of 1 April 2011, para. 131, on how prior 
resort to negotiations represents a limit of consent given by States. See also, generally, S Oda, ‘The Compulsory 
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: A Myth?’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 251. 
31
 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Rep 181, 192. This echoes the 
earlier statement in Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) [1963] ICJ 
Rep 15, Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, 98-99: 
… courts of law are not there to make legal pronouncements in abstracto, however great their scientific value as 
such. They are there to protect existing and current legal obligations, to afford concrete reparation if a wrong has 
been committed, or to give rules in relation to existing and continuing legal situations. Any legal pronouncements 
that emerge are necessarily in the course, and for the purpose, of doing one or more of these things. Otherwise 
they serve no purpose falling within or engaging the proper function of courts of law as a judicial institution. 
 8 
It is clear that the Court cannot legislate … Rather its task is to engage in its normal judicial 
function of ascertaining the existence or otherwise of legal principles and rules … The contention 
that the giving of an answer to the question posed would require the Court to legislate is based on a 
supposition that the present corpus juris is devoid of relevant rules in this matter. The Court could 
not accede to this argument; it states the existing law and does not legislate. This is so even if, in 
stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify its scope and sometimes note its 
general trend.
32
 
 
C. The law-making authority of the International Court 
1. Beyond persuasive authority? 
With no formal authority on which to fall back upon, the persuasive authority of a 
judgment of the Court, in relation to law-making at least, remains theoretically dependent 
purely on the quality of the reasoning contained in that judgment; nevertheless, the Court 
makes a substantial contribution to the development of international law.
33
 From picking up 
any treatise on general international law,
34
 it is evident that there is no gainsaying the 
practical authority and power of judgments of the Court.
35
 Erstwhile judge Thomas 
Buergenthal has called the Court’s engagement with international law a process of ‘normative 
accretion’,36 through which law is not created as with legislative processes, but rather in a 
more modest, incremental fashion, clarifying ambiguities and resolving perceived gaps in the 
law. As such, there is much to the argument that the Court’s influence on international legal 
                                                 
32
 Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Reports 226, 237, para. 18. 
33
 See N Petersen, ‘Lawmaking by the International Court of Justice—Factors of Success’ (2011) 12(5) German 
Law Journal 1295, who attempts to identify empirical, observable developments in international law and 
determine whether there exists a causal link with a judgment of the Court.  
34
 See Lauterpacht, supra note 7, 5; A Pellet, ‘Article 38’, in A. Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice – A Commentary (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2012), 731, 862 et seq.; Brown, ‘Article 
59’, above n 56, 1444-5; and Boyle and Chinkin, above n 10, 268. 
35
 Jennings, above n Error! Bookmark not defined., 8. 
36
 T Buergenthal, ‘Lawmaking by the ICJ and Other International Courts’ in (2009) Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law 403, 403. 
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development is essentially interstitial:
37
 its intervention is punctual, and can later be ignored, 
overruled or limited.  
Even so, the systemic constraints of operating in a decentralised framework give the 
Court’s judgments a heightened influence on the internal understanding of legal rules within 
the system, offering a set of normative expectations that can be relied upon by States. It is an 
agent in the international law-making process.
38
 Accordingly, once a general statement on a 
legal principle or rule has been elucidated by the International Court, both parties and non-
parties cannot in good faith contest that general principle.
39
 Recognition of the International 
Court of Justice’s role as the ‘principal judicial organ’ of the United Nations40 by all States 
compounds the issue, suggesting that the Court enjoys a systemic function exceeding that of 
other international courts. Certainly, the Court regards its own judgments as influential, and 
has expressly granted them a high persuasive value as precedent: ‘[t]o the extent that the 
decisions contain findings of law, the Court will treat them as it treats all previous decisions: 
that is to say that, while those decisions are in no way binding on the Court, it will not depart 
from its settled jurisprudence unless it finds very particular reasons to do so.’41 Its Registry 
                                                 
37
 A term borrowed, as I understand it, from V Lowe, ‘’The Politics of Law-Making, in M. Byers (ed), The Role 
of Law in International Politics (OUP, Oxford 2000) 207, 212-3. 
38
 CJ Tams and A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Barcelona Traction at 40: The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development’ 
(2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 781, 784; Weeramantry, above n 3, 311. 
39
 GG Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’, in Symbolae Verzijl 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1958) 153, 172-3, terms judicial decisions ‘quasi-formal’ sources of international 
law. Weeramantry, above n 3, 321, goes further: the Court’s ‘role and duty must extend beyond the immediate 
case to the elucidation of relevant principles that have arisen for discussion in the context of the case, thereby 
helping in the development of the law.’ 
40
 As spelt out in Art. 92 of the Charter, above n Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
41
 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) 
(Jurisdiction), [2008] ICJ Rep 412, 428, para. 53: This habit is nothing new: the Permanent Court already stated 
in Case of Readaptation of the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, Jurisdiction, 1927 PCIJ Ser A No 11, at 
18, the Court would have ‘no reason to depart from a construction which clearly flows from the previous 
judgments the reasoning of which it still regards as sound.’ Moreover, it was evident to all besides the Court 
prior to 2008: see Pellet, ‘Article 38’, supra note 34, 855-6; M Mendelson, ‘The International Court of Justice 
and the Sources of International Law’ in V Lowe and M Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International 
Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Grotius Publications, Cambridge 1996) 63, 81.  
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has expressed a desire for ‘continuity’.42 But there is more: beyond the walls of the Peace 
Palace, its judgments are regularly scrutinised and observed by the International Law 
Commission,
43
 the General Assembly,
44
 and other international courts.
45
 As such, the Court’s 
view on the binding nature of a rule, if accepted by other participants in the international 
legal community, often determinative. With ‘not even the semblance of any kind of hierarchy 
or system’,46 the authority commanded by the Court is thus particularly noteworthy. The 
Court’s role has been one that perforce clarifies and tidies up the substance of international 
law, and one that serves as a consolidating force. It is an ‘agent’47 in the international legal 
process, participating in the process of legal development without a formal role being 
assigned to it. 
As such Court’s greatest contribution has been to lending authority to the rules that it 
enunciates and applies, as often, and especially in relation to customary law, the Court’s 
recognition of it is seen as determinative.
48
 The Permanent Court set down rules that are now 
                                                 
42
 The Registry of the Court, ‘The International Court of Justice’, (ICJ Publications, 1979), 62-3. 
43
 Tams and Tzanakopoulos, above n 43, 783 make express reference to the ILC’s Commentaries to what have 
become Arts. 19-20 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 8 and Art. 51 of the ‘Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts’, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session, 
UN Doc A/56/10 Chap. V (2001) GAOR 56th Session Supp 10. One can add the Art. 14 of the Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection, GAOR 61
st
 Sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc (A/61/10), which codifies the Court’s practice on 
the exhaustion of local remedies.. 
44
 See eg GA Res 171 (II) (14 November 1947), UN Doc A/RES/171(II); GA Res 3232 (XXIX) (12 November 
1974), UN Doc A/RES/3232.  
45
 Examples abound. The ECtHR has recently done so in Behrami v France, Saramati v France, Germany & 
Norway, Apps. No. 71412 & 78166/01 (May 2, 2007) (decisions on admissibility), (2007) 44 EHRR 52, para. 
147. The ECJ has referred to ICJ case law frequently: see e.g. Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen 
and Diva Navigation Group (Case C-286/90) [1992] ECR-I-6019, para. 10; Opel Austria GmbH v Council of 
the European Union (Case T-115/94) [1997] ECR II-39, paras. 90, 93; Racke GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt 
Mainz (Case C-162/96) [1998] ECR I-3655, paras. 24 et seq., para. 50; 
46
 Jennings, above n Error! Bookmark not defined., 5. 
47
 Lauterpacht, above n 7, 5. 
48
 Pellet, above n 34, 864. 
 11 
seen as foundational to the law on State responsibility.
49
 To give but a few further examples, 
the International Court has made pronouncements on the severability of reservations to 
treaties;
50
 its interpretation of the term ‘armed attack’ contained in Article 51 of the Charter, 
persisting in its view that only attacks committed by States could fall within its scope;
51
 on 
the scope of the right to self-determination;
52
 and on the legal effect of Security Council 
resolutions with respect to actors other than UN Member States and inter-governmental 
organisations.
53
 Further, it could be argued that the Court’s judicial pronouncements with 
respect to boundary delimitations
54
 or with maritime delimitations
55
 appear to be ‘objective 
law’, in that these determinations are to be respected by all States.56 This conclusion is 
misplaced: Article 59 calls upon the parties to a dispute to comply with its legal findings, and 
other States simply respect the positions as to their mutual boundary. Although the effect is 
law-creative, it is the compliance of the States involved, rather than the Court’s judgment 
itself, that formally translates into objective law.  
                                                 
49
 Pellet, 866, cites Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ Ser A No 2, 12, where the Permanent Court set 
out the basic rule on diplomatic protection for injuries suffered to nationals, and Factory at Chorzów, PCIJ Ser 
A No 17, 29, where it set out that the breach of an international engagement involved an obligation to make 
reparation. 
50
 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory 
Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 22-5. 
51
 Israeli Wall, above n 77, para. 139. 
52
 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12, 31, para. 55. 
53
 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo, (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, 450 paras. 116-17. 
54
 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad) (Judgment) [1994] ICJ Rep 6; Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) (Application to Intervene by Equatorial 
Guinea) [1999](II) ICJ Rep 1029; and Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Merits, 
Judgment of 19 November 2012. 
55
 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania/Ukraine) [2009] ICJ Rep 61; Dispute regarding 
Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua)[2009] ICJ Rep 213; Maritime Dispute (Peru v 
Chile), currently under deliberation: see ICJ Press Release 2012/37. 
56
  C Brown, ‘Article 38’, in A. Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice – A 
Commentary (2
nd
 edn OUP, Oxford 2012), 1439. 
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2. Judicial law-making in the application and interpretation of unwritten law 
Certainly, the Court’s interpretation of written law, most prominently international 
treaties and the unilateral acts of States, can constitute an important source of judicial law-
making. Of considerable academic interest, however, is the Court’s role in the interpretation 
and application of unwritten law, in particular of customary law. Although certainly judicial 
decisions are not formally constitutive of customary law, they help to establish its existence, 
providing written confirmation of its existence.
57
 As Jiménez de Aréchaga has observed, a 
judicial pronouncement on a point of customary law becomes a ‘focal point’ that inspires 
subsequent State practice and thus helps to ‘harden’ a rule.58 And it is true that the 
methodology of how the Court has addressed custom demonstrates law-making potential: 
despite the Court’s doctrinal insistence on State practice and opinio juris, it in fact rarely 
refers to these elements.
59
 So goes it with the other unwritten formal source under Article 38 
of the Statute, general principles of law. These principles, conceived as subsidiary in so far as 
they allow for the Court to look to the practice of domestic and international jurisdictions for 
certain principles to be applied in a given case.
60
 The same approach has been adopted by the 
                                                 
57
 A. Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ (2001) 
95 American Journal of International Law 757, goes so far as to declare the Court ‘the ultimate arbiter in some 
cases’ of the existence and content of custom, 772. 
58
 See A Cassese and JHH Weiler (eds), Change and Stability in International Law-Making (Gruyter, Berlin 
1989), 3. This is to be distinguished from the ‘focal point’ in game theory: cf. T Ginsburg and RH McAdams, 
‘Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution’ (2004) 45 William and 
Mary Law Review 1229, 1269; and RH McAdams, ‘A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law’ (2000) 86 
Virginia Law Review 1649. 
59
 Boyle and Chinkin, above n 10, 279, specifically point to Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (United Kingdom v 
Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116, Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction, above n 31, and Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14. Perhaps the most flagrant example is in the 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), [2002] ICJ Rep 3, para. 58, 
where the Court felt no need to justify its methodology in reaching its conclusion on the immunity of foreign 
ministers.  The Court’s formalism drew the ire of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert in her Dissenting Opinion, 
ibid 137, esp 145, para. 13, where she concluded that negative State practice still requires opinio juris. But cf. 
the notable exception of Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy), Judgment of 3 February 2012, 
para. 77, where the Court drew extensively on domestic court judgments as ‘evidence of State practice’. 
60
 The Court is sparing with these: although in its early days the Permanent Court recognised equity in the Free 
Zones of Gex case (Switzerland v France), PCIJ Ser A No 24, 10; the ‘clean hands’ doctrine (see Diversion of 
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ad hoc international criminal tribunals’ approach to general principles, using these to fill 
perceived ‘gaps’ and creating new norms of international criminal law,61 although it would 
seem that the ad hoc tribunals have adopted a consciously teleological interpretation of 
international law, especially in relation to protecting ‘human dignity’.62 
3. Judicial law-making through advisory opinions 
An interesting final aside relates to the International Court’s advisory function. Courts 
seldom give legal advice, advice being the exposition of abstract legal principles to formulate 
and guide future action, rather than the classical judicial function of applying the law with 
finality to a series of facts that have already occurred, in an attempt to settle a dispute.
63
 
Whatever faith placed in the advisory function as a law-creating function is purely 
contingent: in order to constitute law, the opinions must be accepted by the relevant organs 
(ideally also by the requesting organ!), and form the basis for subsequent development.
64
 
Advisory opinions only constitute ‘advice’,65 and are not binding;66 and the Court’s hesitation 
                                                                                                                                                        
Water from the River Meuse (the Netherlands v Belgium) (Judgment) PCIJ Ser A/B No 70), in general the Court 
has been parsimonious in its reference to such principles: see Pellet, above n 34, 838-9 
61
 See e.g. Prosecutor v Delalić, IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001), para. 173 (declaring the acts enumerated in 
Common Article 3 to be international crimes as they ‘shock the conscience of civilised people’); Furundžija, 
above n 61, paras 174 et seq. (situating the definition of rape as a crime against humanity by reference to 
principles found in domestic legal orders); Prosecutor v Kupreškić, IT-95-16-A (23 October 2001), para. 75 
(rejecting national concepts in determining under which test additional evidence reveals an error of fact of such 
magnitude as to occasion a miscarriage of justice; and Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR_96-4-T (2 September 1998), 
para. 597 (concluding through a ‘conceptual approach’ that sexual violence was a form of torture because it was 
a crime against personal dignity). 
62
 See Furundžija, above n 61, para. 184, and Prosectuor v Celibici, IT-96-21 (16 November 1998), para. 170, 
in both of which the ICTY has made reference to purposive interpretations in line with the concept of ‘human 
dignity’. 
63
 For similar reasons, JB Moore opposed the giving of advisory opinions by the Permanent Court: see ‘The 
Question of Advisory Opinions’, Memorandum by Judge Moore presented 18th February 1922, 1922 PCIJ Ser 
D, No 2 (Annex 58a).  
64
 K Oellers-Frahm, ‘Lawmaking through Advisory Opinions?’ (2011) 12(5) German Law Journal 1033, 1049. 
But cf. A von Bogdandy and I Venzke, ‘Zur Herrscahft internationaler Gerichte: Eine Untersuchung 
internationaler öffentlicher Gewalt und ihrer demokratischen Rechtfertigung’, (2010 70 Zeitschrift für 
Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1, 11. 
65
 See, generally, MO Hudson, ‘The Effect of Advisory Opinions of the World Court’ (1948) 42 American 
Journal of International Law 630. 
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to be seen as law-creating is such that in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons advisory opinion, it declined to ‘conclude definitively’ on the permissibility of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons, in an unprecedented non liquet.
67
 
The tension between the advisory function and the contentious function within a 
judicial body goes deep into its function, and has been explored systematically elsewhere.
68
 It 
suffices, however, to appreciate that the advisory function departs somewhat from the classic 
dispute-settling function of judicial institutions.
69
 For example, this may be the reason that 
the parties empowered to submit disputes—States—are strictly separated from those 
authorised to request advisory opinions under Article 96, para. 1 of the Charter, namely, 
United Nations organs and specialised agencies.
70
 The Court itself has addressed the concern 
over possible overlap of these functions, and that the advisory function could be used to 
circumvent the lack of acceptance of its contentious jurisdiction.
71
  
In its advisory capacity, the Court has made a substantial contribution to the 
institutional law of the United Nations. It has expressly affirmed, as a part of the normal 
exercise of its judicial power, the competence to interpret the Charter in Admission of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
66
 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, [1950] ICJ Rep 65, 71; Mazilu, above 
n 80, 189, para 31. 
67
 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 32, 266 para. 105 (Operative Clause), para. 2E. The Court’s non liquet here 
may be indicative of the present state of the international legal system; but it is also a forceful statement of the 
Court’s position on its systemic function. See eg para. 14 of Judge Guillaume’s Separate Opinion: ‘…it is not 
the role of the judge to take the place of the legislator … the Court must limit itself to recording the state of the 
law without being able to substitute its assessment for the will of sovereign States.’ 
68
 This tension is explored in G Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function 
(Oxford University Press, forthcoming), Ch 3 (‘The Judicial Character of the Court’).  
69
 However, a few domestic supreme courts simultaneously and successfully discharge advisory functions: see 
eg the Supreme Court of Canada (Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985 Ch. S-26); and the Supreme 
Court of India (Constitution of India, pt V). 
70
 The division dates from the time of the Permanent Court: see Art. 14, para. 3, of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations. See also Oellers-Frahm, above n 64, 1034-5. 
71
 See Applicability of Article IV, section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1989] ICJ Rep 177, 189. See also Israeli Wall, where Israel raised this angrily in 
written proceedings and refused to participate in the oral proceedings before the Court. 
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State.
72
 It has affirmed the international legal personality of the United Nations 
Organization.
73
 It has specified the extent of the supervisory power of the General Assembly 
with respect to territories under the League of Nations’ mandate system.74 It has offered a 
more precise delineation of the competences of the non-judicial principal organs in respect to 
the budget.
75
 It has allocated the power to interpret the Charter.
76
 It has elucidated the 
competence of the non-judicial principal organs in matters of international peace and 
security.
77
 It has claimed its own power to consider objections to resolutions of the General 
Assembly and Security Council.
78
 It has clarified the ability of political organs to create 
subsidiary judicial organs.
79
 It has clarified, in turn, the UN’s relationship with its member 
States
80
 (and non-member States
81
), and its specialised agencies (vis-à-vis the member States 
                                                 
72
 Conditions for Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter) (Advisory 
Opinion) [1947] ICJ Rep 57, 61. 
73
 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174. 
74
 International Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 128, 131 et seq. 
75
 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] 
ICJ Rep 151, 167.  
76
 ibid 168, where it affirmed the powers of the various principal organs, including the Court itself, in 
interpreting the Charter. 
77
 ibid 163, regarding the concurrent role of the General Assembly alongside the Council in peacekeeping; and 
163, the exclusive competence of the Security Council to take coercive action. See also Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 
[hereinafter ‘Israeli Wall’], 146, where it affirmed the competence of the General Assembly in matters where 
the Security Council is deadlocked under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution.  
78
 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 45. 
79
 Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Advisory Opinion) 
[1954] ICJ Rep 47, 57. 
80
 See Reparation for Injuries, above n 73. In addition, it has considered the obligations of member States when 
confronted with a mandatory Security Council decision (Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahirya v United Kingdom) 
(Preliminary Objections) [1998] ICJ Rep 9, or a General Assembly resolution that is not ‘merely hortatory’ 
(Certain Expenses, above n 75). Member States are also bound by obligations on them under the Convention on 
Privileges and Immunities entered into by the UN and member States: see, e.g., Applicability of Article VI, 
Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) 
[1989] ICJ Rep 177 [hereinafter ‘Mazilu’], and Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (Advisory Opinion) [1998] ICJ Rep 62 [hereinafter 
‘Cumaraswamy’], where the Court considered the nature of the breadth of immunities from national law; 
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of those specialised agencies);
82
 its ability to afford protection to its staff
83
 and ensure their 
fair treatment;
84
 the scope of the powers of the principal organs to establish subsidiary 
organs.
85
  
Thus, the law-making element in advisory opinions is in essence a contribution within 
the process of the development of the law; it is not related to the Court’s formal authority or 
position. The Court’s judicial statement as to what it perceives the law to be, having that 
normative impact on subsequent practice, may initiate a process of clarifying or even creating 
new customary law, through States legitimating their policy choices by reference to a judicial 
pronouncement by the Court.
86
  
 
IV. OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
 
It is truly remarkable that the jurisdictional structures of most international judicial bodies 
established subsequent to the PCIJ/ICJ have diverged from its traditional, consensualist 
structure. In part, this may be due to their institutional proliferation, expanding both in 
number and into areas far beyond the ICJ’s work, i.e. dispute settlement between States and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 
26 June 1947 (Advisory Opinion) [1988] ICJ Rep 3 [hereinafter ‘PLO Mission’], on the UN’s relationship with 
the United States.  
81
 In the Reparation for Injuries opinion, above n 73, 182, the Court finds that the UN to possess international 
legal personality opposable to member states and non-member states alike. 
82
 MS Amr, The International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations (Kluwer, 
The Hague 2003), 159-167 and his discussion of Mazilu, Cumaraswamy, and PLO Mission, above n 80, and the 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) [1980] ICJ 
Rep 73 [hereinafter ‘WHO-Egypt’].  
83
 The most obvious example is Reparation for Injuries, above n 73, 185. 
84
 See Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Advisory 
Opinion) [1954] ICJ Rep 47, 57. 
85
 Application for Review of Judgement No 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Advisory 
Opinion) [1973] ICJ Rep 166 and Effect of Awards, above n 79. 
86
 Oellers-Frahm, supra note 64, 1053. 
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the giving of advisory opinions to international organisations. The contemporary international 
judicial system now admits of individuals being able to submit a claim against a State to an 
international court; it also admits of courts exercising powers normally associated with a 
public function, such as the trial of an individual, or the review of domestic legislation or acts 
for conformity with international obligations. This diversification of functions represents a 
substantive expansion of the work of international judicial institutions. 
Some structural differences between these newer bodies and the ICJ may have helped 
to engender these advances. If one examines the bodies under examination here—the 
European and Inter-American courts on human rights, the World Trade Organization 
Appellate Body (WTO AB) and the ad hoc criminal tribunals established by the Security 
Council for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR)—one notes that these 
are characterised by compulsory jurisdiction over certain categories of disputes, representing 
a qualitative shift vis-à-vis the International Court of Justice.
87
 Perhaps this is due to the fact 
that each body has a limited subject-matter, unlike the Court’s general competence over all 
areas of international law.
88
 But that more limited competence ratione materiae also brings 
with it a certain claim to primacy over that particular area of the law, suggesting that that 
tribunal has a special obligation of legalisation within that particular area of the law. It also 
has allowed, to a point, for access to non-State actors to the work of those particular bodies—
a substantial difference when compared to the ICJ.
89
 
Strikingly, another commonality between the various international courts and tribunals 
has been their consistent desire not to fragment away from international law, but rather, to 
                                                 
87
 Shany, above n 4, 79. 
88
 ibid 80. 
89
 ibid 79. See also R Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law’, (2003) 52 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 13. The present author has also written about the Court’s 
(parsimonious) engagement with non-State actors: see GI Hernández, ‘Non-State Actors from the Perspective of 
the International Court of Justice’, in J d’Aspremont (ed), Participants in the International Legal System: 
Theoretical Perspectives (Abingdon (UK): Routledge Cavendish, 2011), 140. 
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contribute to the general development of that legal order. Aside from an expected—and 
obvious—fidelity to their constitutive statutes and the specialised area of international law on 
which they focus, the emergence of judicial institutions entrusted with various treaty regimes 
has ‘not undermined legal security, predictability or the equality of legal subjects’.90 
Whatever the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, there is still a system of 
international law.
91
  
A. European Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Law-making by the European and Inter-American courts for human rights is characterised 
primarily by the fact that both bodies enjoy, under their respective conventions, final 
interpretative authority. Certainly, the bulk of the human rights courts’ work is to provide for 
individual redress against human rights violations. Yet in doing so, the courts do exercise a 
law-making role: they aim to ensure continuity and consistency over time in the application 
of their respective treaties within the legal orders established by them.
92
 Moreover, because 
both courts have consciously adopted a ‘dynamic’ interpretation of the rights contained in the 
Convention, they have often widened the scope of protection by the Convention.
93
  
                                                 
90
 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalised by M Koskenniemi, 
‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’, GA Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006), 248-9, para 492 [emphasis in original].  
91
 B. Simma and D Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law’ 
(2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 483; PM Dupuy, L’unité juridique de l’ordre juridique 
international (2002) 297 Recueil des Cours 12, 89; T Buergenthal, ‘Proliferation of International Courts and 
Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad?’ (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 267; PS Rao, ‘Multiple 
International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or its Fragmentation? 
(2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 929. 
92
 The term ‘constitutional’ has been (mis)used to describe this particular function: S Greer, The European 
Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (CUP, Cambridge 2006), 7; L Wildhaber, 
‘A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Right?’ (2002) 23 Human Rights Law Journal 161, 
162; R Harmsen, ‘The European Court of Human Rights as a ‘Constitutional Court’: Definitional Debates and 
the Dynamics of Reform’, in J Morrison, K McEvoy and G Anthony (eds), Judges, Transition, and Human 
Rights (OUP, Oxford 2007) 33, 36; M Fyrnys, ‘Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: the Pilot 
Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12(5) German Law Journal 1231, 1232. 
93
 The famous ‘living tree’ interpretation given in Airey v Ireland, 9 Oct. 1979, ECtHR Rep Series A No. 32, 
para. 26; further applied in Stafford v the United Kingdom (GC), No. 46295/99, judgment of 28 May 2002, 
paras. 67-68, and Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (GC) (11 July 2002) (Appl. No. 28957/95), para. 74. 
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Judicial law-making by the two human rights courts has occurred on both a substantive 
and a procedural level, and their case law has compelled States to make far-reaching changes 
to their domestic legislation on a number of rights protected by the conventions.
94
 The ‘pilot 
judgment’ procedure pioneered by the European Court of Human Rights in Broniowski v 
Poland
95
 is instructive. A response to the problem of repetitive cases designed to reduce the 
Court’s heavy caseload,96 the procedure allows the European Court to focus on the 
identification of ‘systemic malfunctioning’ of domestic legal orders; the indication of 
appropriate remedial measures ‘normatively extends the binding effect of the European 
Court’s judgments and changes their legal nature’.97 By moving away from the focus on the 
individual, in this respect, the legal effect of pilot judgments is to impose the European 
Court’s interpretations on the domestic legislative processes of States parties.  
An example of a substantive innovation is the prohibition of amnesties by the Inter-
American Court.
98
 The Inter-American Court has, in a long series of cases, rejected the 
compatibility of amnesty legislation with the ACHR with respect to Argentina, Uruguay, 
                                                                                                                                                        
The IACtHR has adopted a similar view with respect to certain provisions of the ACHR: see Bámaca-Velásquez 
Case (Guatemala) (2000) IACtHR (Ser. C) No.70, in Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: 2000, OEA/Ser.L/V/III.50/doc.4 (2000) 28, at para. 197. 
94
 A thorough list of examples may be found in D Shelton, ‘The boundaries of human rights jurisdiction in 
Europe’, (2003) 13 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 95.  
95
 Broniowski v Poland (GC), Judgment of 28 September 2005, (friendly settlement and just satisfaction), 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-IX. See Fyrnys, 1244-51 for extended commentary. The judgment in 
Broniowski v Poland was a response to the failure to amend Protocol No. 14 to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and the subsequent resolution by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in which 
it invited the Court to engage with ‘underlying systemic problems’ relating to the Convention: see Committee of 
the Ministers of the Council of Europe, Resolution on Judgments Revealing an Underlying Systemic Problem 
(12 May 2004), ECHR Doc Res (2004)3, reprinted in (2005) 26 Human Rights Law Journal 119. 
96
 Fyrnys, supra note 92, 1232-33. 
97
 ibid. 
98
 See C Binder, ‘The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (2011) 12(5) 
German Law Journal 1203, 1204. 
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Peru, and Chile.
99
 In so doing, the Court focussed on the amnesty laws’ ratio legis: in 
shielding perpetrators of grave human rights violations from prosecution, the Court 
determined that the non-derogable, jus cogens nature of the rights the crimes in issue (torture, 
extrajudicial killings, etc) meant that the amnesty laws in issue constituted a violation of the 
survivors’ and victims’ family members’ rights to a fair trial and to judicial protection under 
the Convention.
100
 As with the European Court, the underlying rationale behind the Inter-
American Court’s approach is its claim not only to be the authoritative interpreter of the 
Convention rights, but also of the importance of the legal order created by that instrument.    
B. The ad hoc international criminal tribunals  
That the ICTY and ICTR, the ‘ad hoc’ international criminal tribunals, have engaged in some 
‘adventurous law-making’ is beyond dispute. Paradoxically, it was demanded from the ICTY 
to discharge its functions only by applying existing international law, and refrain at all times 
from creating or ‘legislating’ new customary law.101 Yet it has been argued that the broad 
terms of Security Council Resolutions 827 and 955, establishing the ICTY and ICTR, 
respectively
102
 in fact granted them de facto law-making authority.
103
 The same was not 
                                                 
99
 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Cases 10.145, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.311, 
IACHR Report No. 29/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, corr.1 (1992-93) (Argentina), Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Cases 10.029, 10.36, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, 10.375; IACHR 
Report No. 29/92, OA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, corr. 1 (1992-93) (Uruguay); Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Barrios Altos v Peru, Merits, Judgment of 14 March 2001, Series C, No. 75, and La Cantuta v Peru, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 29 November 2006, Series C, No. 162 (Peru); and Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Almonacid Arellano y otros v Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment of 26 September 2006, Series C, No. 154 (Chile) 
100
 Binder, above n 98, 1211, who gives the example of Barrios Altos v Peru, supra note 99, para. 42. 
101
 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 
presented (3 May 1993), UN Doc S/25704, para. 34. 
102
 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, SC Res 827, 
UN Docs S/25704.36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), UN Doc S/RES/827 (25 May 1993); and 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SC Res 955, UN Doc S/RES/955 (8 November 
1994). 
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demanded of the ICTR, which was free to use customary international law and international 
treaty law,
104
 regardless of whether it was part of customary law.
105
 As such, the additional 
constraint placed on the ICTY seems to have led it to adopt an eccentric, ‘deductive’ method 
of determining customary law, stating the rule first, and then justifying that rule with 
reference to extremely limited case law and State practice.
106
 The justification for this has 
been that State practice only ‘assists’, but rarely ‘constitutes’, the rule.107 Rather surprisingly, 
in the Kupreškić judgment, the ICTY Trial Chamber even conceded that State practice did 
not support the proposition that custom had evolved on the subject of belligerent reprisals, 
only to conclude that the ‘imperatives of humanity or public conscience’ embodied in the 
‘Martens Clause’108 permitted it to deduce opinio necessitatis sufficient to establish 
                                                                                                                                                        
103
 Perhaps because of the haste with which the tribunals were created: see M Kuhli, and K Günther, ‘Judicial 
Lawmaking, Discourse Theory, and the ICTY on Belligerent Reprisals’ (2011) 12(5) German Law Journal 
1261, 1264-5. 
104
 Comprehensive Report of the Secretary-General on Practical Arrangements for the Effective Functioning of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Recommending Arusha as the Seat of the Tribunal, UN Doc 
S/1995/134 (13 February 1995), para. 12.  
105
 M Swart, ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of the Sources of International Law 
and “Adventurous Interpretation”’, (2010) 70 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
459, 461, refers to the ICTR’s acknowledgment of this in Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment 
(2 September 1998), paras. 604-7; Prosecutor v Musema, Trial Judgment (27 January 2000), ICTR-96-13-T, 
para. 242. 
106
 ibid 464; see also A Nollkaemper, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law in the Case Law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’, in TA Vandamme and J-H Reestman (eds), Ambiguity in the Rule 
of Law: The Interface between National and International Legal Systems (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 
2001), 17. 
107
 Swart, ibid 466-8, offers a comprehensive analysis of the ICTY’s loose approach to identifying international 
crimes in customary international law, citing Prosecutor v Tadić, Appeals Judgment, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999, 
paras. 163 et seq. (the scope of the ‘protected person’ status under the grave breaches regime); Prosecutor v 
Furundžija, Trial Judgment, IT-95-17/1 (10 December 1998), paras. 162, 253 (extending the definition of 
torture under customary law); and Prosecutor v Galić, Appeals Judgment, IT-98-29-A (5 December 2003), para. 
88 (identifying the prohibition of terror amongst the civilian population by reference to Art. 51 of Additional 
Protocol I and Art. 13(2) of Additional Protocol II as codifications of customary international law). See also, 
generally, G Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (OUP, Oxford 2005), esp. 127 et seq. 
108
 Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the First Additional Protocol: see Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
(entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (entered into force 21 October 1950), 75 
UNTS 85l Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (entered into force 21 October 
1950), 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (entered 
into force 21 October 1950), 75 UNTS 287; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
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customary law.
109
 Strikingly, the ICTY there invoked various moral and practical 
justifications for its approach, thus confirming to an extent that it was engaging in a form of 
law-making in this particular area.
110
 
C. The World Trade Organization Appellate Body 
Finally, an interesting quasi-judicial system merits some examination, namely, the WTO 
dispute-settlement system, which operates under the aegis of a single WTO Agreement.
111
 At 
the apex of the WTO arrangement, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) exercises a powerful 
reviewing function over the various dispute-settlement bodies constituted under its rules,
112
 
ensuring the coherence and consistent application of the GATT treaties.
113
 In this respect, the 
WTO may be distinguished from the various investment tribunals constituted under the 
ICSID Convention, all of which apply separate treaties and are subject to separate review 
mechanisms.
114
  
                                                                                                                                                        
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (entered into force 
7 December 1978), 1125 UNTS 3. 
109
  Prosecutor v Kupreškić, IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, para. 527. This is in line with A. Cassese, 
International Law (2
nd
 edn OUP Oxford 2006), 160-1, arguing that the Martens Clause loosens the requirement 
of usus and elevates opinio juris in relation to the laws of humanity. 
110
 Kuhli and Günther, above n 1272, 1275-6, suggest that these types of reasons constitute a form of ‘norm 
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The WTO Appellate Body has made a strong normative claim to authority through its 
systematic reliance on its own precedent, despite the fact that authoritative interpretation of 
the WTO Agreement vests exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of it in the Ministerial 
Conference and the General Council.
115
 Yet from its inception, the WTO Appellate Body has 
made a point of referring to its previous decisions: although they are not binding, they are 
said to ‘create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken 
into account where they are relevant to any dispute.’116 Much like the International Court, the 
lack of binding quality of its decisions is thus secondary to its persuasive power;
117
 and the 
Appellate Body has in fact intimated that to do otherwise would amount to a failure of 
exercising a proper judicial function.
118
 As such, it has asserted not only its power 
authoritatively to interpret States’ obligations under the GATT, but more importantly, its 
power to develop the law by way of interpretation. Examples abound: it has clarified and 
developed the scope of Article XX GATT, the umbrella clause relating to exceptions that can 
be invoked by States to the other obligations in the GATT.
119
 It has clarified the intentionally 
vague language in Article 4(2)(b) of the WTO Agreement, in relation to the causation 
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analysis to be used in safeguard cases.
120
 It has filled in gaps in the WTO Agreement relating 
to the procedures to be followed before it.
121
 In so doing, it has established not only a 
substantive body of law, but one that is ‘autonomously developing’122, and has raised 
concerns over expansiveness in judicial law-making.
123
 Given the WTO’s dispute-settlement 
body’s compulsory jurisdiction over all matters within its competence,124 the Appellate 
Body’s decisions have potentially far-reaching significance. 
D. Interaction between international courts and tribunals? 
There is a certain reciprocal cross-fertilisation between international courts and 
tribunals, with the unlikeliest recent participant being the International Court of Justice. The 
ICJ appraised the ICTY’s case law in the Bosnia Genocide judgment of 2007 (only on 
questions of fact; it declined to endorse their legal findings); it has cited arbitrations (in 
Continental Shelf and the Alabama arbitrations);
125
 it has referred to the findings of the 
European Court of Human Rights by analogy in order to interpret Article 7 of the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
126
 It has even cited domestic courts: see 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, where it referred to domestic judgments as ‘evidence 
of State practice’.127 The ICTY has equally engaged in a practice of citing the judgments of 
other courts and tribunals,
128
 and has perhaps provided the clearest example of their 
subsidiary, non-binding nature.
129
 The Tribunals’ citation to municipal courts has generally 
been in relation to general principles or State practice in confirming the existence of a 
customary rule.
130
 Needless to say, and perhaps because they share a common Appeals 
Chamber, the two ad hoc tribunals extensively, but not always, cite each other’s decisions.131 
There are obviously more examples, notably, the WTO’s constant engagement with the 
international law rules on treaty interpretation,
132
 and the practice of other courts.
133
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The varied judicial institutions are surprisingly uniform in their application of general 
international law, and make frequent reference to one another.
134
 As for the reasons for such 
mutual borrowing, it has been suggested again that it is due to the gravitational effects of 
judicial pronouncements: novel legal conclusions are better justified with persuasive 
authority from other international judicial institutions, as they enhance a judgment’s 
legitimacy,
135
 especially if there is a perceived ‘gap’ in the law. Any legal system has gaps 
that, as they are revealed, demonstrate that the legislator did not anticipate a certain situation: 
the judicial function’s role is then to assume an essentially suppletive role, applying 
principles rooted in the system itself so as to extend the law into that particular dispute.
136
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
It bears recalling that judicial law-making is an essentially retrospective exercise: 
because the judicial institutions surveyed here have arrogated this role for themselves, it is 
only after the fact that one can determine whether their reasoning has in fact been adopted by 
wider international society.
137
 As such, there is much in Schwarzenberger’s comment that the 
law-making potential depends on ‘the fullness and cogency of the reasoning’ contained in a 
judgment’.138 Yet ultimately, 
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[judicial law-making] cannot attempt to lay down all the details of the application of the principle 
on which it is based. It lays down the broad principle and applies it to the case before it. Its 
elaboration must be left … to ordinary legislative process or to future judicial decisions disposing 
of problems as they arise.
139
 
 
Although it should be clear from the above analysis that, on some level at least, international 
judicial law-making indeed constitutes element of the judicial function, this conclusion 
should not be overstated, as it places excessive faith in an inchoate international judiciary. 
There is no conscious, overt coordination between the various courts and tribunals. The 
various international courts and tribunals remain hobbled, each with its own 
Missionbewusstsein,
140
 guarding a set of value judgments embedded within its constitutive 
instrument. As such, whilst these can constitute valuable contributions to our understanding 
of international law, the judgments of the various international courts and tribunals should be 
seen as evidentiary, and not constitutive, in their essence. It it certainly exciting for some to 
envisage the prospect of international courts and tribunals breaking the shackles of formalism 
and articulating the contours of a genuine international community, of speaking truth to 
power. Yet to do so makes a number of presumptions: it implies a substantive conception of 
what the law of the international community ought to be, something difficult to discern 
objectively when most definitions of ‘international community’ are value-laden or so 
inchoate as to be of little use.
141
 Moreover, it a misplaced faith that international judicial 
institutions would naturally perpetuate this vision through their law-making contributions; but 
it is equally possible that courts become handmaidens to the status quo, endlessly reinforcing 
                                                                                                                                                        
be, it cannot, in the conditions in which its jurisdiction is in law, and in compliance with its decision is in fact, 
essentially of a voluntary character, dispense with that powerful appeal to opinion which stems from the 
reasoned content of its pronouncements.’ 
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the validity of the system through recourse to arguments of concreteness (validity) and 
normativity (justice), as per Koskenniemi’s oft-quoted, but still apposite, description of 
international legal argument.
142
  
However unsatisfactory this might seem, perhaps judicial institutions respond to a sort 
of ‘societal demand’ in exercising a law-creating role, translating social or community 
interests into general legal concepts, giving ‘general and articulate formulation to 
developments implicit, though as yet clearly accepted, in actual international custom or 
agreement of States.’143 International lawyers, working within a conceptually ill-clarified 
system, have a habit of clinging to whatever authorities can be marshalled in support of an 
argument, even though specific pronouncement by a judicial institution ‘cannot be divorced 
from the general framework of normative argument in the society within which it operates.
144
  
Because judicial pronouncements are structured around these general frameworks, they 
provide a basis for future development, permitting other international actors to apply the 
principles so articulated, to clarify them, modify them or opt out from them. It is that 
normative potential, to influence the development of international law, which shapes the law-
creating role of judicial institutions: not any formal law-creating authority. 
 
                                                 
142
 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (CUP reissue, CUP, Cambridge 2005), 58, 219. 
143
 Lauterpacht, above n 7, 173. 
144
 V Lowe, International Law (Clarendon, Oxford 2007), 99. 
